on manual detection of D h S attacks after which amine linegrain trallic analysis is performed and new Ptering rules are installed manually to the routers The need of human intervention results in poor response time and fails to protect the victim before severe damages are realized The expressiveness of existing tiltering rules is also too limited and rigid when compared to the ever-evolving characteristics of the attacking packets. Recently, we have proposed a D h S defense architecture that supports distributed detection and automated on-line attack characterizatioa In this paper, we will focus on the design and evaluation of the automated attack characterization, selective packet discarding and overload control portion of the proposed architecture. Our key idea is to prioritize packeb based on a perpacket score which estimates the legitimacy of a packet given the amibute values it carries. Special considerations are made to ensure that the scheme is amenable to high-sped hardware implementation. Once the score of a packet is computed, we perform score-based selective packet discarding where the dropping threshold is dynamically adjusted based on (1) the score distribution of recent incoming packets and (2) the current level of overload of the system.
I.
MOTTVATION One of the major threats to cyber security is Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack in which the victim network element(s) are bombarded with high volume of fictitious, attacking packets originated from a large number of machines.
The aim of the attack is to overload the victim and render it incapable of performing normal transactions. DDoS attacks can be categorized into end-point attacks and infrustnrcture urtacks. In an end-point attack, the victim can he an individual end-host or, more typically, an entire customer stub-network served by an Internet Service Provider (ISP). In an infrastructure attack, high volume of attacking packets are forced through a port of an ISP router to create one or more choke-points within the ISP infrastructure based on the knowledge of the routing pattern within the domain. Currently, most ISPs merely rely on manual detection of DDoS attacks.
Once an attack is reported, an offline fme-grain traffic analysis Recently, the DDoS problem has attracted much attention from the research community. So far, the focus has been on the design of traffic marking and traceback protocols pal, PaOl, SaOl, SnOl] which enable downstream routers to determine and notify the upstream routers of the attackmg packets. Most of the work emphasizes the backward compatibility of protocol support for traceback under the existing Internet infrastructure. Once the upstream sources of the attack have been identified, proposed pushback mechanisms [I002, Ya021 are used to contain the damage of the attack. However, the effectiveness of such an approach is contingent upon the ability to extract a precise characterization of the attacking packets. Without such characterization, the legitimate traffic within the suspicious flows will he equally affected by the pushback mechanism. While there has been recent work by the data-mining research community to recognize intrusion patterns using offline machine-leaming approaches [Le98, Ma991, these schemes are mostly offlineoriented. An exception to this trend is the D-WARD approach [Mi02] , which does perform limited statistical traffic profiling at the edge of the networks to perorm online detection of new types of DDoS attacks. By monitoring the nominal perdestination type traffic arrival and departure rate of TCP, UDP, ICMF' packets, as well as any abnormal asymmetrical behavior of the two-way traffic at the edge router connecting to a stub-network, D-WARD aims at stopping DDoS attacks near their sources, i.e., the ingress routers. While such "sourceside" tackling approach is attractive in terms of having less demanding operating-speed and scalability requirements, its viability lunges on the voluntary cooperation of majority of ingress network administrators Internet-wide. In theory, one can circumvent this deployment problem by applying the D-WARD approach to the backbone network. However, in order to realize such a backbone approach, one must address the key scalability issues such as the large number of targets required to be protected and the high operating speed within the backbone network. This is indeed the emphasis of our proposed scheme. There are also a small set .of commercial products [Mazy Rive] whch advertise limited support of statistics-based adaptive filtering techniques. However, most of these solutions do not fully automate packet differentiation or filter enforcement. Instead, they only recommend a set of binary filter rules to the network administrator to be installed in their routers or firewalls. The recommended rule set is often too complex to be comprehensible, let alone to be debugged or modified. The technical details of their statistics-based adaptive filtering schemes are not available to the public. The performance of the schemes, especially in terms of scalability and impact on legitimate traffic is not clear either. The situation is well summarized by a quote from a recent article on anti-DOS device review Fool]:
"In the end, we felt as though we were lefrplaying Russian roulette when it came to installing the recomrnendedfilters."
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 11, we provide an overview of the entire PacketScore DDoS defense archtecture. In Section 111, we focus on the design and implementation of the intelligent packet differentiation, selective discarding and overload control portion of our proposal, which is the main subject of this paper. In particular, we will concentrate on a standalone implementation of these schemes, whch is directly applicable for protecting infrastructure DDoS attacks. Due to limited space, the details of their distributed implementation are beyond the scope of this paper, and will be the subject of a sequel of this paper. In Section IV, we evaluate the performance of the standalone packet differentiation/ discarding scheme. The paper is concluded in Section V with a list of future investigation directions.
OVERVIEW OF THE PACKETSCORE APPROACH
Recently, we have proposed a defense scheme based on distributed detection and automated on-line attack characterization [LaO3] . The proposed scheme consists of the following 3 phases:
-Detect the onset of an attack and identify the victim by monitoring four key traffic statistics of each protected target while keeping minimum per-target states.
Differentiate between legitimate and attacking packets destined towards the victim based on a readilycomputed, Bayesian-theoretic metric of each packet. The metric is the so-called "Conditional Legitimate Probability" (CLP).
.
1
Discard packets selectively by comparing the CLP of each packet with a dynamic threshold. The threshold is adjusted according to (I) the distribution of CLP of all suspicious packets and (2) the congestion level of the victim.
We name our scheme the PacketScore approach because CLP can be viewed as a score which estimates the legitimacy of a suspicious packet. By taking a score-based filtering approach, we avoid the problems of conventional binary rulebased filtering discussed in Section I. The score-based approach also enables the prioritization of different types of suspicious packets. It is much more difficult, if not impossible, for rule-based filtering to support such prioritization. The ability to prioritize becomes even more important when a full charactnization of the attacking packets becomes infeasible. By linking the CLP discard threshold to the congestion level of the victim, our approach allows the victim system to opportunistically accept more potentially legitimate traffic as its capacity permits. In contrasf once a rule-based filtering scheme is configured to discard a specfic type of packets, it does so regardless of the victim utilization.
For end-point attacks, we employ a scalable, distributed attack detection process using Bloom filter/ leaky bucket arrays PFLBA) similar to those proposed by [FeOl, Ed21 to monitor key traffic statistics of each protected target. The BFLBA's allow us to simultaneously monitor such statistics for a large number of protected targets while keeping minimal per-target state information. Distributed attack detection is realized via a DDoS control server (DCS) which correlates and consolidates possible incidents reported by routers residing along a security perimeter. We refer such routers as Detecting-Differentiating-Discarding routers (3D-R). Once an attack victim is identified, the 3D-Rs collaborate with the DCS to perform a distributed, online characterization of the attacking traffic by comparing the fine-grain charactnistics of the suspicious traffic with a nominal traffic profile of the victim. The result enables each 3D-R to compute a "score", i.e., the CLP, for each suspicious packet at wire-speed which ranks the likelihood of the packet being an attacking packet, given the attribute values it carries, using a Bayesian-theoretic approach. Based on a dynamic thresholding mechanism against such score, the 3D-Rs perform selective packet discarding and overload control for the victim in a distributed manner. The DCS coordinates this distributed overload control process by adjusting the threshold dynamically based on the arrival rate of suspicious traffic and score distributions reported by different 3D-Rs. Fig. 1 depicts the support of distributed detection and overload control by a set of 3D-Rs and DCSs.
From here onwards, we focus the design and implementation of the intelligent packet differentiation, selective discarding and overload control portion of our proposal, which is the main subject of this paper. In particular, we will concentrate on a standalone implementation of these schemes, which is directly applicable for protecting infrastructure DDoS attacks.
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DETAILED PACKETSCORE METHODOLOGIES
In this section, we first discuss the design issues as well as implementation details related to the packet differentiation, selective packet discarding and overload control the proposed scheme.
A. Packet Differentiation via Fine-grain Tra$;c Profile Comparison
Once a DDoS attack is detected, the next step is to distinguish the attacking packets from the legitimate ones amongst the suspicious traffic. Our approach is to perform online profiling of the suspicious traffic and compare the findings with the nominal traffic profile of the victim. The viability of this approach is based on the premise that there are some traffic characteristics that are inherently stable dnring normal network operations of a target network, in the absence of DDoS attacks.
A disproportional increase in the relative frequency of a particular packet attribute value is an indication that the attacking packets also share the same value for that particular attribute. The greater the disproportional increase, the stronger the indication. The more '"abnormal" attribute values a packet possesses, the higher the probability that the packet is an attacking packet. For example, if it is found via that the suspicious packets contain abnormally high percentage of (1) UDP packets and (2) packets of size S and (3) packets with TTL value T, then UDP packets of size S and TTL value 2 ' destined to the DDoS victim should he treated as prime suspects and given lower priority upon selective packet discarding during overload.
Candidate packet attributes considered to be used for traffic profiling include: the marginal distributions of the froclion' of recently amved packets having various (1) IP ' Profiling against relative frequency of different attribute values (instead of absolute packet arrival rates) helps to alleviate the difficulties caused by the expected fluctuation of nominal traffic arrival rates due to time-of-the-day and day-of-the-week behavior.
protocol-type values, (2) packet size, (3) serve? port numbers, (4) source/ destination IP prefixes', ( 5 ) Time-to-Live (TTL) values, (6) IP/TCP header length4, (7) TCP flag patterns. We are also interested in the fraction of packets which (8) use IP fragmentation and (9) bear inconect IPITCPRTDP checksums. It is worthwhile to consider the joint distribution of the fraction of packets having various combinations of (IO) packet-size and protocol-type, (1 1) server port number and protocol-type, as well as (12) sonrce IP prefix and TTL value.
To validate our claim of the relatively "invariant" nature of the distribution of the above packet attributes, we have conducted extensive statistical analysis on real-life Internet traces collected from the traffic archive of the WIDE-project [WIDE] . Fig. 2 Fig. 2 that while the fraction of an attribute value does vary over the 1 %hour period, the variation is always withii a few percentage of the total number of packets amived over a IO-minute window. Due to the overwhelming volume of DDoS attack packets compared to normal ones, the formers are expected to increase the fraction of particular attribute values they cany by more than a few percentage and change the overall distribution substantially. Furthermore, the variability of nominal attribute value distribution can he substantially reduced if hourly time-of-theday profiles are used.
One may argue that it is relatively straightforward for a sophisticated attacker to leam the approximated distribution of some attributes, e.g. protocol-type, TCP-flag pattern and packet-size, based on publicly available data on Internet traffic characteristics, and thus be able to generate the attribute distributions for the attacking packets accordingly to circumvent our profile-haxd differentiation scheme.
We employ the heuristics-of taking the server port number to he the minimum of the source and destination port numbers carried by the packet. This eliminate the need of identifying whether the packet is client-hound or server-bound. Also, since client port number is usually selected in random by the client operating system, it does not meet the "invariant" criteria to he used for profiling.
In our study, we have used the 16-bit I P prefix as an approximation of the IP subnet. In practice, we can extract the actual prefix-length of the subnet from routing tables andlor route-server databases. This is to detect possible abuse of IPITCP options. Note however that distributions of other attributes such as TTL and source IP-prefixes, and to a lesser extent, server-port distribution, are expected to be site-dependent (or link/port dependent) and thus more difficult for an outside attacker to collect such information. For instance, it is quite difficult for an outsider to determine the jointdistribution of source-I€-prefix and the TYL value for a given site. As long as there exists profiling information which is known only to the sitehetworkqerator hut not to the attacker, our scheme can use it as the information edge to differentiate among attackmg and legitimate packets
I ) Conditional Legitimale Probability
In this section, we formalize the notion of conditional legitimate probability of a suspicious packet which measures the likelihood of the packet being a legitimate (instead of an attacking) one given the attribute values it possesses. Consider all the packets destined towards a DDoS attack target. Each packet canies a set of discrete-valued attributes A, B, C, .... where pn ( p , ) is the nominal (cmently measured) utilization of the system, respectively. Here we have used p, 1 p, to estimateNn 1 N, . ObseNe that, since pn I p, is constant for all packets within the same observation period, one can even ignore its contribution when comparing and prioritizing packets based on their CLP values as long as the packets arrive within the same observation penod. -If we assume the attributes to be independent of each other, Eq.( 1) can be rewritten as, . . . , , . , . . . . . Eq. (2) where p , ( X ) ( P,(X)) is the marginal probability mass function of packet attribute X under nominal (currently measured) traffic conditions, respectively. To achieve a compromise between profde storage requirement and the need to capture imporrant inter-attribute dependency, we use joint distribution(s) for the smngly-correhted attributes while using marginal distribution(s) for the remaining ones. The CLP is therefore expressed in the form of a product of marginal and joint probability mass function values. In Section IV, we w i l l compare the performance. impact and storage requirements for different combinations of marginal/ joint distributions.
2) Variation of Nominal Profiles
In the above formulation, we have assumed that the nominal profiles, i.e., Je((A,B,C,. ..) and P,(X)'s are constant for ease of illustration In general, the nominal traffic profile is a function of time which exhibits periodical time-oftheday, e.g., d i d , day-of-the-week variations as well as long term trend changes. While long-term profile changes can be handled via periodical recalibration using standard timeseries forecast and extrapolation techniques plOO], the daily or weekly variation between successive re-calibration may require time-of-theday, day-of-the-week specific M i c profiles. To reduce storage and maintenance requirement of a large set of time-specific nominal profdes, our approach is to use a high percentile, say 95-percentile, of the fraction of each attribute value obsewed amongst the multiple time-of-theday nominal profiles as the corresponding reference value. In Section IV, we w i l l investigate the performance impact due to inherent variation of nominal traffic profde.
3) Managing Nominal Traflc ProJiles using Iceberg-style Histograms
We expect that a nominal haffic profile of each target to be consisted of a set of marginal and joint distributions of various packet attributes. This profding information will be stored in the form of ~rmalized histograms of one or higher dimensions. Due to the number of attributes to be incorporated in profile (in the order of ten or more) and the large number of possible values of each attribute (as much as tens of thousands or more, e.g., in the case of possible source IF' prefues), an efficient data structure is required to implement such histograms. This is particularly important for the case of distributed overload control because trafiic profiles have to be exchanged between the 3D-Rs and the DCS. Towards this e n 4 we propose to use iceberg;srYe histograms [Ba02]. By "iceberg-style", it means that the histogram only includes those entries in the population which appear more frequently than a preset percentage threshold, say x%. This guarantees that there are no more than 1OO/x entries in the histogram. For entries which are absent from the icebergstyle histogram, we will use the upper bound, i.e., x% as their relative frequency. Due to the vast dimensions of joint distribution functions, an iceberg-style implementation is particularly i m p o m . With iceberg-style histograms, a finegrain per-target profile can be kept to a manageable size. As we w i l l demonstrate in Section lV, in practice, most packet attributes are dominated by a smll set of attribute values. As such the actual number of non-null values, the so-called number of icebergs, in the corresponding iceberg histograms are much smaller than the maximum bound given above. More impo-y, one-pass iceberg-style histogram maintainancel updates can be implemented efficiently in hardware, e.g. by applying a twostage pipelined approximation of the scheme proposed in [KaO3] . Tradeoffs between iceberg-threshold, histogram storage requirement and packet differentiation performance are discussed Section IV. 
4) Real-time Trafic Projlmng and Per-packet CLP Computation
According to Eqs. (I) and (2), the real-time per-packet processing of a naive implementation of the CLP computation seems formidable: The current packet attribute distributions have to be updated as a result of the arriving packet. The CLP for the incoming packet can be computed only after the packet attribute distributions have been updated. To make wirespeed per-packet CLP compuIation possible, we decouple the update of packet attribute distribution from that of CLP computation to allow CLP computation and packet attribute distribution to be conducted in parallel, but at different time-scales. With such decoupling the CLP computation is based on a s~p s h o t of 'recently" measured histograms while every packet arrival (unless additional sampling is employed) will incur changes to the ament packet attribute histograms. To be more specific, a frozen set of recent histograms is used to generate a set of "scorebooks" which maps a specific combination of attribute values to its corresponding "score". The scorebooks are updated periodically in a time-scale longer than the per-packet arrival time-scale, or upon detection of sigrufcant change of the measured MIC profile. By assuming attribute independence and using the logarithmic version of Eq. (2) as shown below.
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In practice, an ISP may choose to perform comprehensive nominal traffic profiling for the set of "premium-paying" stubnetworks only. For the rest of the end-points, the ISP may choose their pro6les from a set of standard templates based on their business nature. ingress access speed as well as their size.
we can construct a scorebook for each attribute that maps Merent values of the attribute to a specitic partial score. For instance, the partial score of a packet w i t h attribute A equal to a, is givenby [log(Pn(A = a,)-log(P, (A = a,) ].
According to Eq.(3), we can sum up the partial scores of different attributes to yield the logarithm of the overall CLP of the packet. This scorebook approach enables hardware-based computation of per-packet CLP hy replacing numerous floating-point multiplications and divisions in Eq.(2) with simple additions and table lookups. This scorebook approach can be readily extended to handle nominal profiles which contain of a mixture of marginal and joint packet attribute distributions. Of c o w , the scorebook for a multipleattribute jointdidbution w i l l be larger. The size of the scorebnok can be m e r reduced by adjusting (1) the iceberg threshold and (2) quantization steps of the score.
B. Selective Packet Discarding and Overload Control
Once the CLP is computed for each suspicious packet via fine-grain real-time traffic profiling, selective packet discarding and overload control can he conducted using CLP as the differentiating metric. The key idea is to prioritize packets based on their CLP values. Since an exact prioritization would require offline, multiple-pass operations, e.g., salting, we take the following alternative approach to realize an online, one-pass operation: First, we maintain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the CLP of all incoming suspicious packets using one-pass quantile computation techniques described in [Ch00,GrUl]6. We then discard a snspicious packet if its CLP value is below a dynamically adjusted threshold'.
If there is a need to guarantee certain minimum throughput for particular types of packets, we can incorporate such "immunity" rules by amficially boosting the scores of a given portion of these specific types of packets. Comparing to a score CDF representation using constant width score-buckets, a 100-quantile score CDF representation works much better due to the unpredictable spacing of packet scores in advance.
Also, a 1% resolution in system utilization is already fine enough for overload control purpose.
' For practical implementation, we actually keep the CDF of log (CLP) of all suspicious packets and apply the discarding threshold against log (CLP). This is to eliminate the need of performing realtime inverse logarithm aAer the partial scores of various attributes are summed up according to Eq. (3). When a suspicious packet* arrives, the following tasks are performed in parallel:
(1) The aggregate arrival rate towards the victim is adjusted. This, in tnm, changes the input of the loadshedding algorithm (2) The packet attribute values are used for updating the fine-grain traffic profile, i.e. measured histograms, of the suspicions traffic.
(3) The CLP-based score is computed for the arriving packet using frozen scorebooks generated from a recent snapshot of suspicious MIC profile.
Once the score of an arriving packet is'computed, the score CDF is updated. The packet is then discarded if its score is below the current discarding threshold, Thd. Notice that the use of frozen scorebooks is essential for the parallelization of For endpoint attacks, the suspicious packets att the ones which destinate to the victim subnet. For infrastructure attacks, all the packets passing through the victim choke-point are considered to be suspicious.
tasks (2) and (3). It is also important to re-emphasize that, while CLP-computation is always performed for each incoming packet, selective packet discarding only happens when the system is operating beyond its safe (target) utilization level pmge,. Otherwise, the overload control scheme will set to zero.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we w i l l evaluate the performarre of the proposed CLP-based packetdiscarding scheme in a standalone setling via simnlation Unless stated othenvise, the default settings for the simnlation is summarized in Table 1 . Performance Criteria: First, we examine the differences in the score distribution for attack and legitimate packets. Such differences are quantified using 2 metrics, namely, RA and RL as illustrated in Fig. 4 . While RA and RL can quantify the score differentiation power, the final outcome of selective discarding also depends on the dynamics of the threshold update mechanisms. We therefore also measure the false positive (i.e., fraction of legitimate packets got falsely discarded), and false negative (i.e., fraction of attacking packets got falsely admitted) ratios of the proposed scheme. To check the effectiveness of the overload conhul scheme, we compare the actual output utilization pout against the target maximum utilization pwe set by the scheme
A. Different Attack Types
defending against the following types of attacks:
We have evaluated the performance of Packetscore in
Generic attack all attribute values of the attacking packets are uniformly randomized over their corresponding allowable ranges.
TCP-SYN Flood attack SQL Slammer Worm attack
Nominal affack all attacking packets resemble the most dominant type of legitimate packets observed in practice, i.e. 1500-byte TCP packets with sewer-port 80 and TCP-flag set to ACK, with uniformly random source IP addresses. Mined attack: eqnally combines the above 4 types of attacks while keeping the overall attack rate to the 10 times of that of the target rate
Changing attack: Similar to the Mixed aftack except that the different types of attacks take turns. An attack type is randomly selected and continues for an exponentially distributed period.
The corresponding results are depicted in Table 2 . In general, the proposed packet scoring scheme can successfully distinguish between attacking and legitimate packets. In all cases except the Changing attacks, RA and RL are above 99%. It is notewonhy that the fake positive probability for the TCP-SYN flood attack is kept at a very low level (0 and 0.39%). Although the signature of the TCP-SYN flood packets can easily be derived by the Packetscore scheme, the ability of Packetscore to prioritize legitimate TCP-SYN packets over attacking ones based on other packet attributes, e.g. source Ip prefvt and lTL, is an essential feature. Without such priorization, e.g. in the case of stateless delsignature-based fdtering, all TCP-SYN packets would have been discarded and thus ensure the success of the DDoS attack towards the victim.
Changing attacks are more challenging due to their complex/ time-vaqing attacking packet characteristics. When the average change-period of the attack is much longer than the measurement/ scorebook generation intewaI (300 sec vs. 60 sec in our case), the change in attacking packet characteristics can readily be tracked. However, when such changes occur at the same (or shorter) time-scale of the measurement update intewal, the Packetscore scheme can be misled to defend against some no-longerexist attack packets. packet is used to crash the entire system. Sipture-based filtering would be more appropriate for such types of attacks.
C. Nominal Projle Sensitiviy
In this subsection, we study the effect of the choice of nominal profile. Table 3 .
Observed from Table 3 that while the false mgative probability is always maintained at a very low level (at most 1.65%), the false positive probability for Thursday and Friday 1-hour traces using the Monday profile is unacceptably high (> 38%). Upon further examination of the data, we find that this is an artifact of our default setting of ptsrgef according to the maximum traffic rate of the baseline profile observed over any IO-minute window (which is about 1 IOOpps for the Monday trace). Since the incoming traffic rate for the Thursday and Friday traces are si&icantly greater than the Monday one, such default choice of pWet inadvertently forces the system to discard a sigNficant portion of legitimate packets. As shown in Table 4 , the poor performance due to the mismatch among different daily legitimate traffic profile and can be overcome by using the default weekly proffie as described in Table 1 .
D. Different Scoring Slrategies
In this subsection we exQlore the trade-offs of using Merent combinations of mar@ and joint attribute distributions in establishing the nominal profde. Table 5 describes the options for baseline profile/scorebook generation. Fig. 7 shows the differentiation performance and storage requirements of these five scoring options. As expected, among the five options, ( 5 ) yields the best scoring/ differentiation performane at the expense of increased storage size for baseline-profile and scorebook, while (1) has the smallest baseline-profile/ scorebook footprint. The performance improvement of (2) over (l), (as well as (4) over (3)) is due to the exploit of dependency among packetsize. protocol-type and server-port number. The improvement of (3) over (1) (as well as (4) over (2)) reflects the information value of source LF' prefuces, even at a very coarse l6-bit granularity. The advantage of ( 5 ) over (4) illustrates the value of dependency information between source IP prefLw and Tn value, which to a large extent, caphms the nominal "distance" between the source and the site/pott/link to be protected.
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E. Setting the Iceberg Thresholds
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of iceberg threshold value on packet differentiation performance and profile/ scorebook storage requirements. We have considered two different iceberg threshold setting strategies. Under the static strategy, we fm the iceberg thresholds for all single attribute m a r p a l distributions, Zdimensional and 3-dimensional joint distributions at 0.01, 0.001 and 0.0001 respectively. Under the adaptive strategy, the iceberg threshold value is determined separately for each marginall joint distribution of interest so that 90% 95% or 99% of the overall entries observed in the baseline trace are covered by the corresponding iceberg histograms. Table 6 Performance results against different thresholding methods Table 6 summarizes the results of these various approaches.
As shown in Table 6 , there is no sigmiicant difference in the differentiation power of all the approaches. However, since the adaptive iceberg-threshold setting strategy should be more robust against possible changes in nominal profde traces, it is recommended over the static shategy. Among differenl coverage of the adaptive strategy, the 9O%-coverage produces the hest balance between storage requirement and differentiation performance. It also shows that with iceberg histograms, each nominal profile (as well as its comsponding set of scorebooks) q u i r e s less than loOKbyte of memory.
V. CoNCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have outlined an architecture using a set o f collaborating 3D-Rs and DCSs to defend against DDoS attacks. The proposed scheme leverages hardware implementation of advanced data-stream pmcessing techniques, including onepass opemiom of iceberg-style histograms and quantile (CDQ computations, to enable scalable, highspeed fine-grain traffic profiling and per-packet scoring. We have studied the performance and design tradeoffs of the proposed packet scoring scheme in the context of a stand-alone implementation Such scheme can tackle never-seen-before DDoS attack types by providing a statistical-based adaptive differentiation between attacking and legitimate packets to drive selective packet discarding and overload control at high-speed.
In a sequel of this paper, we will study the performance of a distributed implementation of the proposed scheme. In particular, we will investigate the effects of update and feedback delays, as well as the impact of profile and score CDF resolutions on t h e performance of the dismbuted implementation. We will also study the ability and possible enhancements of the proposed scheme for defending against more sophisticated DDoS attacks. Another investigation topic is on how the time-scale of updates of the scorebooks, score CDF, and dynamic discarding threshold, will impact the response time and decision error of the proposed selective packet discarding scheme when subject to more orchestrated synchronized DDoS attacks. While the current CLP-based packet differentiation is theoretically attractive due to its Bayesian roots, it is conceivable to use a surtugate packet differentiating metric to replace CLP and design an even more hadware-amenable scheme based on a rudimentary perattribute scoring mechanism e.g. using an array of leakybuckets. We intend to study the performance and complexiity 0-7803-8355-9/04/$20.00 QZW4 IEE.
trade-offs of such alternatives for hardware implementation Purpose.
